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THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRIDGE. 
PERSPECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
NEUROAESTHETICS
Art can be studied by philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, 
theologians, computer scientists, educationalists, neuro-scientists, 
critics and, of course, art historians. Most would agree that although 
no single perspective alone can offer an exhaustive explanation, the 
competences, knowledge and methods derived from different fields 
are nonetheless helpful and necessary in analysing a phenomenon as 
diverse and complex as art.1 Therefore it seems to be in the interest 
of art historians (aestheticians, critics and artists) to embrace the 
expertise offered by other fields. This article seeks to throw some 
light on the possibilities and perils of implementing the knowledge 
and means from other fields of research, such as evolutionary and 
neuropsychology, to the understanding of art.
Even Marcel Duchamp, who famously claimed that painters were 
dumb (ʻbête comme un peintreʼ), would hardly have seriously doubted 
that creation (as well as the reception) of art inevitably occurs with the 
participation of the brain. Yet for many (especially in art world), the 
idea of the neurology of art entails has strange and even dangerous 
implications. While it is generally not difficult to concede that 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12697/BJAH.2019.17.06
1  Oliver Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain (London: Picador, 2008), 5.
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neurological processes are responsible for simple emotions, affects 
or urges, there is a widespread reluctance to accredit the laws of 
the brain with the so-called higher functions that include creation 
and experience of art and aesthetic pleasures. We are accustomed to 
assuming that the value and attraction of art is defined by its very 
indefiniteness, in the different ways it nurtures, excites and annoys 
its viewers.2 From this perspective it may appear that placing art in 
the context of the evolutionary development of the human species or 
analysing it through the means of cognitive neuroscience demystifies 
or even denigrates art.3
On the other hand, the humanities, while holding a traditionally 
repellent stance toward non-humanitarian input, have, especially 
since the second half of the 20th century, rather enthusiastically 
implemented various theories, ideologies and methods from the social 
sciences. In the psychology of art, the turn towards socio-historical 
settings in the analysis of the higher cognitive functions was paved 
by Lev Vygotsky and cultural-historical psychology.4 Indeed, while 
the Kantian concept of art as the domain of disinterested pleasure 
has been radically criticised, the humanities have (perhaps all too 
willingly) recognised art as the subject of ideologies and social 
discourses. One may feel prompted to ask whether and how theories 
of culture based, for instance, on Marxism or psychoanalysis are 
more appropriate and functional than those based on evolutionary 
psychology or studies of the brain.
The humanities and natural sciences are of course differentiated by 
their distinct methods. As the requirement of empirical verifiability 
is often unattainable or even undesirable in aesthetics, it may well 
seem that the objectives and methods of the natural sciences and 
humanities are indeed incompatible. Brain researcher Gerhard Roth 
argues that this separation of the spheres of natural and humanitarian 
interest is reasonable as long as a fundamental difference is assumed 
between the nonhuman nature and the field of human activities 
(including culture). According to this view the field of nature 
is generally consistent with the laws of nature, and Therefore, 
immutable, predictable, unhistorical and unindividual, while the 
2  Semir Zeki, Inner Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 216.
3  Ibidem, 219.
4   Jüri Allik, ʻKunst ja psühholoogia ,ʼ Looming, 9 (1970), 1393.
field of humans, in contrast, is held to be volatile, unpredictable, 
historical and individual. Naturally, the fact that the human mind 
and consciousness are indeed natural phenomena hardly renders 
such an exclusion of human beings from the realm of nature (and 
studies of natural sciences) defendable.5
The sceptical and protective position that the humanities hold 
over their field is described by Denis Dutton: ʻFor the usual culture 
theorist, the picture came to look like this: to be sure, the biological 
structure of the body – the corpuscles of its blood, its organs, its 
musculature – were dictated by DNA and RNA. Darwin and the 
biologists were credited with that much. Culture, however, was 
completely different. It was a realm of free activity that engraved itself 
on a mental blank slate: culture was the uncontested domain of the 
humanities, untouched by biology.ʼ In Dutton’s view, an all-embracing 
ideology of social construction was laid down in the humanities 
that separated themselves from biological realities. According to 
these ʻblank-slate theories of the mindʼ not only some, but all of 
our artistic meanings and value ascriptions derive from history and 
culture. As to theories of art, it became the general view that meaning, 
emotion, and aesthetic experience are matters of unconstrained 
cultural developments completely unrelated to Darwinian evolution 
and the biology of the brain. According to Dutton this view meshed 
perfectly with an important aspect of modernist ideology – the belief 
that our ability to adapt to new kinds of art has no limit whatsoever, 
beauty can reside in any perceptual object, aesthetic pleasure can 
be taught and art can be anything.6
NEUROAESTHETICS, POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
Only recently has a discipline known as cognitive neuroscience 
of art or more prevalently neuroaesthetics risen to the fore from 
among the various disciplines that approach the subject of aesthetics 
using non-humanitarian methods. The rise of neuroaesthetics 
can be seen as part of a wider explosion of neuroscience that was 
triggered by the invention of various technological devices, such 
5  Gerhard Roth, Aus Sicht des Gehirns (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 228–229.
6   Denis Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution (New York: 
Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 204–205.
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hold a neurobiological explanation of the mind principally possible. 
Third strand of philosophers such as David Chalmers and Joseph 
Levine argue that the aforementioned explanatory rift renders the 
problem of the brain and the mind insoluble.8
It must be stressed that neither neuroaesthetics nor other 
bridging disciplines between humanities and natural sciences 
can reasonably be expected to replace humanitarian aesthetics. 
It seems clear their efficiency is at most a complement to the 
humanitarian discipline. While a multiplicity of perspectives is 
inevitable in analysing a phenomenon as complex as art it is also 
important to acknowledge the limitations of different methods. 
Neuroaestheticians Anjan Chatterjee and Oshin Vartanian break 
down the experiments in neuroaesthetics into three general 
systems of neural circuitry: sensory–motor, emotion–valuation, 
and meaning–knowledge systems. Neuroaesthetics tend to focus 
on the first two components of this triad, while recognising its 
short arms in the third department which is rather more culturally 
determined.9 Cognitive neuroscientist Martin Dresler has remarked 
that while the creation and reception of art depends on an individual 
and his or her neural processes, the definition or recognition of an 
object as a work of art (or even more so, a great work of art) hinges 
on socio-cultural processes that cannot be reduced to the neural 
mechanisms of the visual system.10
Assuming the immutability of the human brain during 
the last thousand or so years, neuroaesthetic theories regard 
artistic experiences and judgements throughout history as being 
commensurate and comparable. The more closely a scientific 
hypothesis is related to the biological perceptual system, the more 
we can generalise the results across time. For instance, it can be boldly 
assumed that the biological conditions of the sensation of colour or 
movement have not changed in the historical era.11
8  Roth, Aus Sicht des Gehirns, 142–143.
9   Anjan Chatterjee, Oshin Vartanian, ʻNeuroaesthetics ,ʼ Trends in Cognitive Sciences, (18) 
2014, 370–375.
10  Martin  Dresler,  ʻKunst  und  Neurowissenschaft ,ʼ Neuroästhetik: Kunst – Gehirn – 
Wissenschaft, ed. by Martin Dresler (Leipzig: Seemann, 2009), 29.
11   Per O. Folgerø, Lasse Hodne, Christer Johansson, et al., ʻEffects of Facial Symmetry 
and Gaze Direction on Perception of Social Attributes: A Study in Experimental Art History ,ʼ 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 10 (2016), 9.
as electroencephalography (EEG), functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), and positron emission tomography (PET). The 
unprecedented possibility of monitoring the brain while it is working 
allowed neuroscience direct access to the analysis of mental abilities 
(sensations, thinking, imagination, remembering, planning) as 
well as affects and emotional states.7 Thereby, an alternative non-
humanitarian means of analysing mental processes and experiences 
(among others creation and reception of art) emerged.
While aesthetics traditionally deals with creation, reception and 
thinking about arts, neuroaesthetics is more specifically concerned 
with the role of the brain in these processes. Thus, neuroaestheticians 
apply neuroscientific methods to problems of aesthetics, such as the 
general criteria of aesthetic decisions, the common part of pleasures 
derived from different arts, relationship between aesthetic experience 
and everyday experience, connection between aesthetic experience 
and different kinds of knowledge, the problem of the universality 
and individuality of aesthetic experience, etc.
Neuroaesthetics searches the human brain for universal conditions 
and laws of art. Here we once again encounter the mind-body problem 
related to the possibility of explaining the mind using the methods of 
natural sciences. On the one hand, nothing in the human brain has 
been found that would contradict the laws and principles of nature. 
Hence, provided that mental processes originate from the brain, it 
should be at least in principle possible to understand the relationship 
between the brain and the mind via natural sciences. On the other 
hand, in describing the relationship between the biological brain 
and human mind we encounter a fundamental explanatory rift that 
lies in the fact that human beings experience states of consciousness 
differently from the way they experience material things and 
processes. In other words, the brain and the mind are places where 
the otherwise rather clear notions of subjectivity and objectivity 
seem to lose their traction. According to a more optimistic approach 
(neurophilosophers Patricia and Paul Chuchland) this problem 
is solvable and it is possible to replace ʻeveryday psychologicalʼ 
descriptions of states of mind with a more exact neuroscientific 
terminology. Other philosophers such as Thomas Metzinger and 
Michael Pauen reject such a ʻreductionalistʼ solution but nevertheless 
7  Roth, Aus Sicht des Gehirns, 11.
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the implications of these axioms related to the theories of art based 
on natural sciences.
The area of research that aesthetics and history of art cover 
ranges from the Stone Age to the latest Venice Biennale, the Kassel 
documenta and the Art Basel fair. There is hardly another field of 
culture that is characterised by comparable historical ruptures and 
inner heterogeneity. Indeed, even the most diverse forms of music are 
linked by their basic format of sound, even the most different forms 
of dance share the movement of bodies in space, each and every film 
in the history of cinematography is comprised of something recorded 
by a camera etc. Meanwhile in (contemporary) art, there is no such 
common attribute – in the discipline formally known as visual arts 
the current output does not even have to be visual. The heterogenous 
assembly of contemporary art works is atomized in between various 
formats that lack any possible common nominator, apart from their 
institutional ties (i.e. they are produced by artists, recognized as 
art by specialists and exhibited in museums and galleries). Thus, 
when we compare classical painting or modernist sculpture with 
conceptual installations or performances, the need for different 
theories becomes quite evident.
Neuroaesthetic theories (as all individual aesthetic theories) do 
not have an explanatory capacity to cover the entire spectre of art’s 
history and present. Thus, there should be no shame in admitting 
that brain research and evolutionary psychology have proven 
impotent in deciphering the conceptualist vogue so prevalent in 
contemporary art. Conceptual art works tend to be self-referential 
and ironic, questioning their very own medium, as well as traditional 
aesthetic values, to the point where the works of art amount to little 
more than their idea or concept. Alexander Kranjec suggests the 
reason neuroaesthetics have largely ignored conceptual art lies in 
the incompatibility of its methods to the unpacking of the complex 
layers of intent and reference that define many individual works.14
Due to aforementioned methodological difficulties, but perhaps 
also the natural sciences backgrounds of most writers, neuroaesthetic 
theories tend to stress the visual nature of art. For instance, the 
leading neuroaesthetician Semir Zeki also concedes that, based on 
14   Alexander Kranjec, ʻConceptual Art Made Simple for Neuroaesthetics ,ʼ Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 9 (2015), 3.
In criticism of such an approach, a discrepancy between aesthetic 
judgements over time (e.g., the paintings by van Gogh are valued 
highly today but not so much in his lifetime) has been pointed 
out. Therefore, as the argument goes, the relationship between 
experimental art and its viewer does not conform to the universal 
principles of psychology and neuronal mechanisms.12 While this 
argument certainly holds a grain of truth, the opposite view, i.e. 
that historical shifts in art and intercultural differences make it 
impossible to state any general claims about art, would be equally 
misleading. Thus, as is so often true in life, in this case the truth 
also lies somewhere in between.
In defence of his method the neuroaesthetician Vilayanur S. 
Ramachandran has called reductionism the ʻmost powerful strategy 
known to science .ʼ This may hold truth in the context of natural 
sciences but, as noted, to view the processes of the brain and their 
products (such as art) in an exclusively biological perspective would 
be limiting. The human brain is shaped not only by genes (the 
bottom-up processes), but also by a wealth of past experiences (top-
down effects), including something we call culture. Therefore, in order 
to understand mental phenomena, it is not enough to demonstrate 
their causal relationships with neural mechanisms, but a satisfactory 
explanation should also involve non-physical factors (thus making it 
more difficult to make universal generalisations). Of course, in case 
of aesthetics this primarily means a knowledge of the history of art.13
SOME FEATURES OF THE NEUROAESTHETIC 
THEORIES OF ART
At this point, the fundamental principles related to the theories of art 
need to be recalled. Firstly, no theory of art is capable of satisfactorily 
explaining of all kinds of art, while each worthwhile theory can, 
to some extent, explain some kind of art. Secondly, the distinction 
between the theory and ideology of art is essentially vague and 
therefore explanations based on art theory cannot be easily separated 
from value judgements and artistic preferences. Next, I will look into 
12   Dresler, ʻKunst und Neurowissenschaft ,ʼ 29.
13   Erich Harth, ʻArt and Reductionism ,ʼ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11 (3/4) (2004), 
111, 114.
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current knowledge, it is almost impossible to say anything beyond 
the most general about the relationship between brain physiology 
and the perception of more complex, narrative and representational 
works. According to Zeki, visual art is largely, though not exclusively, 
a product of the activity of the visual brain. The function of the visual 
complex of the brain that coincides with the function of visual art 
is search for knowledge and constancies in a changing world. To be 
more precise, visual works of art entail representations of essential 
features of objects or situations generated by the brain on the basis 
of all the examples that it has encountered. Therefore, according to 
Zeki, artists are, in a sense, neurobiologists who without knowing 
it use artistic means to study the brain and neural processes. All 
the other functions of art, such as social or psychological function, 
merely supplement this main function.15 While the pretension of 
having found the underlying principle of all painting is almost 
certainly overreach, this theory is very applicable to certain forms 
of modernist painting and sculpture. Indeed, Zeki illustrates his 
theory with examples of various styles of experimental modernist 
art that, he argues, correspond to certain areas and functions of the 
visual brain (e.g., the paintings of Piet Mondrian address area V1 
corresponding to horizontal and vertical lines;16 the Fauves appeal 
to area V4 responsible for reactions to colour,17 while kinetic art aims 
at V5 that manages visual signals of movements,18 etc.).
In addition to visuality, another feature often prominent in 
the analyses of art from the natural sciences side is the mimetic 
function of art – of course, this is also a feature long abandoned by 
mainstream aesthetics as hopelessly outdated. Neuroanthropologist 
Merlin Donald has argued that human evolution moved from the 
ʻepisodicʼ life of apes to a ʻmimeticʼ culture of humans. The latter 
flourished and lasted for tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of 
years before language and conceptual thinking evolved. Donald 
proposes that mimesis or the power to represent emotions, external 
events, or stories using gesture, posture, movement and sound is still 




Fig. 1. Ülo Õun, The Nuclear Physicist. 1969. Art Museum of Estonia.
161160 Per sPecti ves and Limitations of neuroaestheticstõnis tatar
literary scholar G. Gabrielle Starr has put it: ʻI believe that aesthetic 
experience helps us understand a world we cannot fully predict, 
helps us value things that are new and learn how to compare what 
seems, at first, incommensurable.ʼ23
From the viewpoint of evolutionary psychology and 
neuropsychology, culture, including art, is not merely a cultural 
convention projected on the blank sheet of the human mind, but 
also a reflection of human nature as represented by evolution in 
the structure and functioning of the brain. This applies not only 
to the conditions of creation, but also the reception and judgement 
of art. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has identified a complex 
association of universal emotions that he calls ʻother-praisingʼ 
emotions. They are not local manifestations of basic affects, such as 
joy, curiosity or pleasure in amusement, but a specific and irreducible 
family of human emotions in their own right. These other-praising 
emotions include gratitude for the actions of others, admiration for 
the excellence in another person, particularly for displayed skills, and 
a heightened sensibility that Haidt calls elevation. Haidt sees these 
emotions as an innate ʻresponse to non-moral excellence .ʼ Presumably 
they are adaptations by the human mind to social relationships.24 
Built into human sociality they are sources of a distinct pleasure 
of admiration, and as such, the reasons we take so much joy in a 
masterfully conceived and realised work of art.
As already mentioned above, the approaches to art based on the 
natural sciences tend to be more neutral and distanced from its object 
compared to the usual humanist methods. Instead of stressing the 
historic and local differences and cultural exceptions, researchers 
with natural sciences background tend to search for the universal 
qualities of art. According to Dutton, the universality of art and 
artistic behaviours, their spontaneous appearance everywhere across 
the globe and throughout recorded human history, and the fact that 
in most cases they can be easily recognized as art across cultures, 
suggest that they derive from a natural, innate source: a universal 
human psychology. In this respect, the universality of art resembles 
another persistent human proclivity: language use.25
23  Starr, Feeling Beauty. The Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience, 26–27.
24   Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution, 190–192.
25  Ibidem, 30.
the bedrock of human culture today.19 In similar vein, Denis Dutton, 
a philosopher of art, asserts that human beings are born image-
makers and image-enjoyers. ʻImitation is a natural component of 
the enculturation of individuals. This is from the creative side: from 
the experiential side, human beings enjoy experiencing imitations, 
whether pictures, carvings, stories, or play-acting.ʼ20
Another prominent aspect is the difference in tonality used by 
researchers and theoreticians with natural sciences backgrounds to 
address the qualities of art such as beauty and emotion. In sharp contrast 
to the dismissing attitude shared by most humanities, neuroaestheticians 
and other representatives of the natural sciences approach to aesthetics 
tend to accredit these features with a new meaning. Art has historically 
and universally striven towards beauty and the expression of emotion, 
thus these qualities probably have a deeper function in art than just 
pure cultural contingency. Whereas the prevalent view in modern 
humanities holds that beauty is arbitrary and superficial, psychologist 
Nancy Etcoff stresses the irrational and hedonistic essence of the 
experience of beauty: ʻOur body responds to it viscerally and our 
names for beauty are synonymous with physical cataclysms and bodily 
obliteration – breathtaking, femme fatale, knockout, drop-dead gorgeous, 
bombshell, stunner, and ravishing. We experience beauty not as rational 
contemplation but as a response to physical urgency.ʼ 21
As to the emotions that works of art are capable of capturing, it 
has been argued they function as ʻrelevance detectors .ʼ Thus the 
Darwinian function of expression of emotions is to provide swift 
appraisals of objects, people, events, and thoughts that represent 
their value for our own needs, desires, survival, sense of self, and 
sense of community.22 If emotions are indeed a means used by the 
brain to emphasize what is important, then perhaps the traditional 
association between arts and emotional values is not just another 
culturally determined contingency but rather an anthropological 
characteristic and, indeed, an essential part of human nature. As 
19  Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain, 268. See: Merlin Donald, Origins of 
the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991).
20   Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution, 33.
21  Nancy Etcoff, Survival of the Prettiest. The Science of Beauty (New York: Anchor, 2000), 9.
22  G. Gabrielle Starr, Feeling Beauty. The Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience (Cambridge, 
MA; London: The MIT Press, 2015), 21–22.
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Humanist aesthetics have reacted to such ideas with a degree of 
astonishment and reproaches of reactionary conservativism. William 
P. Seeley, a philosopher of art and cognitive scientist, has asserted that 
he is surprised ʻby the degree to which the folks on the neuroscience 
side of these endeavours are committed to a core aestheticism. In 
this regard the term “neuroaesthetics” isn’t just a name. It reflects an 
ideological bias about the nature of art. And this is a sticking point.ʼ 26 
The philosopher of art John Hyman has gone as far as labelling ideas 
expressed by neuroaestheticians Ramachandran and Hirstein as ʻthe 
Baywatch Theory of Art ,ʼ claiming that it dʻoesn’t distinguish between 
a work of art and the kind of object that it represents. For example, if 
it doesn’t distinguish between a sculpture that represents a woman 
with big breasts and a woman with big breasts.ʼ 27
26   William P. Seeley, ʻWhat Is the Cognitive Neuroscience of Art... And Why Should We 
Care? ,ʼ American Society for Aesthetics, 31 (2) (2011), 2.
27   John Hyman, ʻArt and Neuroscience ,ʼ Beyond Mimesis and Convention, ed. by Roman Frigg, 
Matthew C. Hunter. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 262 (Dordrecht; Heidelberg; 
London; New York: Springer, 2010), 250.
TOWARDS A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF ART
If we were to agree that art is not a purely arbitrary and conventional 
socio-cultural construction (a blank sheet to be filled with just about 
anything), and instead acknowledge that it is a universal phenomenon 
transcending cultures and historical periods, then we would have to 
consider the possibility that human beings accommodate an innate 
complex of conditions of artistic activities. Now, an adequate and 
inclusive description of such conditions (which we might call the 
ʻart instinctʼ) would amount to nothing less than a biologically 
based theory of art that would provide a neutral ground for future 
(humanist) analyses of art.
However, it should be underlined once more that an objective 
theory of art that draws on empirical and evolutionary psychology 
and neuroscience is not to be juxtaposed with the humanist theories 
of art. The fact that art as a universal phenomenon springs from a 
general innate complex of skills and propensities does not contradict 
the fact that society, culture, art history and the art world also exert 
a remarkable influence on the organisation of the broad spectre of 
aesthetic tastes and artistic styles. Indeed, we could say that art is 
largely a cultural affair, but the instinct it strives to answer is of the 
natural world.28 Therefore, it is not possible to understand art as a 
human practice without understanding both.
Having stressed the mutual compatibility of humanist and 
scientific approaches to art, there is one influential theory of art 
that appears to be irreconcilable with theories of natural background. 
Unfortunately, this is also the most powerful one in today’s art world, 
namely the institutional theory of art that implicitly underlies the 
entire contemporary paradigm of art. It can be assumed that some 
of the reasoning for the sceptical or outright confronting attitude 
shared by most mainstream humanitarian discourse is hidden behind 
this conflict.
The institutional theory of art was first formulated in the 1970s by 
George Dickie, who famously claimed that art is exclusively defined 
by institutional forces operating in the art world. Historically this 
theory emerged as an answer to the avant-garde movements of the 
early 20th century, and offered a way to rationalise these extremely 
28   Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution, 206.
Fig. 2. Ülo Sooster, Eye in the Egg. 1962. Tartu Art Museum.
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eccentric and irregular phenomena as works of art in a way, that in 
its cynical simplicity, bordered on elegance. Accrediting all artistic 
and aesthetic phenomena exclusively to arbitrary institutional 
decisions, the institutional theory of art leaves no room to embrace 
the anthropological or neurobiological aspects that may underlie 
artistic practices. If art is indeed solely an arbitrary construction 
executed by cultural institutions, then it is clearly superfluous to 
question whether things like Duchamp’s ready-mades qualify as 
works of art at all. According to institutional theory they must be 
art for the simple reason that the institutions of the art world have 
widely acknowledged them as such.
The obvious conflict between an upside-down toilet utensil placed 
on a podium and the intuitive conception most people hold of a 
work of art are dismissed as little more than ignorance and inertia 
of the backward public. According to Dutton, we should at least be 
suspicious of this uncoupling of understanding of art from empirical 
psychology. While somewhat successfully explaining why objects like 
the ʻFountainʼ can, under certain circumstances, be recognized as art, 
institutional theory remains tight-lipped and inefficient in explaining 
the overwhelming majority of art created by different civilisations 
in different periods of history. In words of Dutton, it is odd that 
against this glorious availability philosophical speculation about 
art has been inclined toward endless analysis of an infinitesimally 
small class of cases, provocations such as Duchamp’s ready-mades or 
John Cage’s 4’33’’. The obsession with accounting for art’s problematic 
outliers, while intellectually challenging, has left aesthetics ignoring 
the wide and diverse centre. ʻFrom Lascaux to Bollywood, artists, 
writers, and musicians often have little trouble in achieving cross-
cultural aesthetic understanding. The natural centre on which such 
understanding exists is where theory must begin.ʼ29
As Dutton cleverly points out, the glaring stringency of the 
institutional theory of art is even accidentally disclosed by its author 
George Dickie. Arguing that art is defined by its institutions and 
their attendant cultural practices, Dickie notes: ʻThat tradition has 
run very thin at times and perhaps even ceased to exist altogether 
during some periods, only to be reborn out of its memory and the 
need for art.ʼ Alas, the man behind the institutional theory himself 
momentarily lets down his guard and inadvertently reveals there is 
also a thing such as a ʻneed for artʼ and that this need is, in fact, so 
fundamental that it precedes the institutions of art and guarantees 
its continual reinvention whenever it lapses. Why Dickie does not 
elaborate on such an important phenomenon remains a mystery but 
according to Dutton, it is indeed this very necessity for art – actually a 
certain set of capacities, propensities and preferences evolved mainly 
during the Pleistocene epoch – that forms the common grounds of 
all arts.30
Even with the institutional theory of art itself being quite 
dismissive of other theories, the situation in the arts that it fosters 
can be subordinated to neuroaesthetic analysis. Chatterjee references 
a brain imaging study where people were shown patterns that they 
thought were taken from museums or generated by computers. There 
was greater activity in the participants’ medial orbitofrontal cortexes 
(i.e. the location known to manage rewards) when they were shown 
images that they thought were in museums (compared to when they 
29   Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution, 4, 50–51.
30  Ibidem, 40.
Fig. 3. Ülo Sooster, Torso. 1967. Tartu Art Museum.
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were told they were not). Thus, we can reasonably conclude that 
rewards are modulated by context, information actually changes 
the emotional experience, and aesthetic experience is affected by 
knowledge.31 While this finding may be interpreted in various ways, 
it certainly helps us understand why people are willing to put up 
with (or even take genuine pleasure in) the excesses of avant-garde 
and contemporary art.
A more positive example of synthesis between the humanities 
and natural sciences can be found in Semir Zeki’s neuroaesthetic 
interpretation of Clive Bell’s theory of significant form. In his 1914 
book called Art, Bell famously postulated the existence of a universal 
and intercultural aesthetic feeling. This specific feeling is aroused by 
the formal qualities (lines, colours and their combinations) in works of 
art, which he calls significant forms. Zeki argues that if Bell is indeed 
right and aesthetic emotion is, on the one hand, subjective and, on 
the other hand, independent of culture and knowledge we should 
ask whether this feeling is bound to a specific area or pathway in the 
brain. Experiments undertaken to locate a correlate for the experience 
of beauty in the brain have pointed to medial orbito-frontal cortex 
(mOFC) of the frontal lobes. This area of the brain becomes active 
when subjects (regardless of cultural background) experience beauty. 
The experience of beauty also activates other areas of the brain, 
but as far as is known, mOFC is the only area that becomes active 
irrespective of whether the source is visual, musical or mathematical. 
Thus it can be understood to be the representation of beauty in the 
brain on a somewhat abstract level. Also, a correlation has been 
established between the level of activation of mOFC and respondent’s 
evaluation of intensity of his or her experience. According to Zeki, 
this would provide an answer to a fundamental problem of aesthetics, 
namely, the possibility of objective aesthetic judgements (ʻobjectiveʼ 
referring here to the detectability and quantifiability of the mOFC 
activity).32
31   Anjan Chatterjee, ʻWhere There Be Dragons: Finding the Edges of Neuroaesthetics ,ʼ 
Criticism and Theory of the Arts, 31 (2) (2011), 5. See: Ulrich Kirk, Martin Skov, Oliver Hulme, 
Mark S Christensen, Semir Zeki, ʻModulation of Aesthetic Value by Semantic Context: An fMRI 
Study ,ʼ NeuroImage, 44 (2009), 1125–1132.
32   Semir Zeki, ʻClive Bell’s “Significant Form” and the Neurobiology of Aesthetics ,ʼ Frontiers 
in Human Neuroscience, 7 (November 2013), 1–3.
Zeki also argues that the significant form defined by Bell as lines, 
colours and their combinations is too narrow a concept. In his words 
a term better suited to our knowledge of the visual complex would 
be ʻsignificant configurationʼ – a term that would also comprise 
other aesthetically appreciated attributes, such as faces, bodies, and 
motions. Placing Bell’s theory in a neuroaesthetic framework Zeki 
argues that the somewhat mystical laws of significant form actually 
denote preferred activation patterns of certain areas of visual brain. 
Thus, the skill (or ʻgeniusʼ) of an artist capable of creating ʻsignificant 
formsʼ (or cʻonfigurationsʼ) can be rephrased in natural sciences 
terminology as an ability to create forms that activate these areas 
in an optimal or specific manner that differs from their activation 
through stimuli that are not ʻsignificant formsʼ (or cʻonfigurationsʼ). 
Zeki speculates that perhaps it is only when activated in this specific 
Fig. 4. Ville-Karel Viirelaid, Waiting for a Curator. 2006. Tartu Art Museum.
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manner that the sensory areas of the brain give rise to aesthetic 
emotion.33
IN CONCLUSION: AN HYPOTHESIS
To conclude I would like to offer a general hypothesis concerning 
modernist and avant-garde art and the rules of the brain. Elaborating 
on his concept of the ʻart instinctʼ Denis Dutton offers a twelve-part 
set of core items that reflect the realm of human experience, which 
people, regardless of their cultural background, have little trouble 
identifying as artistic. This cluster of supposedly cross-cultural 
features of art includes: (1) direct pleasure; (2) skill and virtuosity; 
(3) style; (4) novelty and creativity; (5) criticism; (6) representation; (7) 
special focus; (8) expressive individuality; (9) emotional saturation; 
(10) intellectual challenge; (11) art traditions and institutions; (12) 
imaginative experience. According to Dutton this list identifies the 
most common ʻsurface featuresʼ of art that are observed across 
the world, and thus, ʻpresents in its totality a definition of art: any 
object that possessed every feature on the list would have to be a 
work of art.ʼ34
I would suggest these characteristics to be projected onto the 
general tendencies of art in the modernist era (from Paul Cézanne 
to the conceptual art of the 1970s). As a possible starting point for 
future analyses I would propose the following idea – the art of 
the modernist period was in fact an unconscious yet systematic 
negation of the conditions of art prescribed by the laws of the 
brain. Even after modernist culture was discarded in the early 
seventies and replaced by a more inclusive and less dogmatic 
culture of postmodernism, this paradigm of a blank-slate view of 
culture has implicitly endured in the art world in the form of an 
institutional theory of art. To put it most simply – if institutionalists 
and cultural constructivists are right and the human mind and 
culture are merely blank sheets to be filled by absolutely anything 
(and the seemingly universal characteristics such as those listed 
by Dutton are merely arbitrary cultural contingency), then there 
is indeed no need to study the evolutionary or neuropsychological 
33     Zeki, ʻClive Bell’s “Significant Form” and the Neurobiology of Aesthetics ,ʼ 6–9.
34   Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution, 51–61.
foundation of art. But if we have doubts, as I suspect many of us 
do, then one of the challenges in this early phase of the biologically 
and psychologically fundamented analysis of art should be to throw 
light on this inherent and ideological bias, which is deeply rooted 
in the humanistic discourse of arts.
Tõ n i s TaTa r :  Th e Po s s i bi l i T y of  a br i d g e.  Pe r s P ec T i v e s  a n d 
li m i TaT ion s of ne u roa e s T h e T ic s
K e y wo r d s:  n e u roa e s T h e T ic s;  br a i n;  be au T y;  i n s T i T u T iona l i s m; 
mo de r n i s m
SUMMARY
In the traditional study of humanities non-humanitarian input 
into the study of culture has usually been rejected. According to 
humanist theories, only the meanings and values derived from 
history and culture can be attributed to art. Recently a discipline 
known as neuroaesthetics has risen to the fore from among the 
various disciplines that use non-humanitarian methods to approach 
the subject of aesthetics. Triggered by the invention of various 
technological devices (EEG, fMRI, PET), neuroaesthetics is now 
being used to tackle the role of the brain in the processes of creation, 
reception and even thinking about arts.
When introducing new perspectives, such as neuroaesthetics, it is 
important to acknowledge the limitations of the different methods. 
A narrow reductional approach to art and the brain clearly does not 
suffice – a satisfactory explanation must also involve non-physical 
factors, such as knowledge about the history of art. On the other 
hand, as with any theoretical approach, the explanatory capacity 
of neuroaesthetics varies when applied to different kinds of art. 
Neuroaesthetic theories tend to stress the visual, mimetic and 
emotional nature of art, often associating artistic features with the 
activity of the visual brain as well as evolutionary psychology.
Instead of stressing historic and local differences and cultural 
exceptions, researchers with a natural sciences background tend 
170 Tõnis TaTar
to search for the universal qualities of art. This appears to be 
irreconcilable with the institutional theory of art that implicitly 
underlies the entire contemporary paradigm of art. It can be assumed 
that some of the reasoning behind the sceptical attitude shared by 
most mainstream humanitarian discourse is hidden in this conflict. 
It can even be claimed that, under the banner of institutionalist ideas, 
the art of the modernist period constituted a systematic negation of 
the conditions of art prescribed by the universal qualities of art based 
on the laws of the brain. Therefore, one of the challenges in this early 
phase of the biologically and psychologically based analysis of art 
should be to shed light on this inherent and ideological bias that is 
deeply rooted in the humanistic discourse of arts.
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